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Relations between children’s imaginary companion status and
their engagement in private speech during free play were investi-
gated in a socially diverse sample of 5-year-olds (N = 148). Control-
ling for socioeconomic status, receptive verbal ability, total number
of utterances, and duration of observation, there was a main effect
of imaginary companion status on type of private speech. Children
who had imaginary companions were more likely to engage in cov-
ert private speech compared with their peers who did not have
imaginary companions. These results suggest that the private
speech of children with imaginary companions is more internal-
ized than that of their peers who do not have imaginary compan-
ions and that social engagement with imaginary beings may
fulﬁll a similar role to social engagement with real-life partners
in the developmental progression of private speech.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
Y license.Introduction
Modern research on the developmental progression of children’s private speech (e.g., Berk &
Garvin, 1984; Diaz & Berk, 1992; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003) supports Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) conten-
tion that this form of self-talk is gradually internalized during early childhood and transformed into
inner speech or verbalized thought. Indeed, the degree of internalization of private speech has been
formalized into a three-level coding scheme (Berk, 1986), from task-irrelevant speech (Level 1)
through self-guiding, task-relevant comments (Level 2) to covert whispering and verbal lip
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1992; Kohlberg, Yaeger, & Hjertholm, 1968), a time when children frequently talk out loud to them-
selves while engaged in a range of activities. As children get older, their private speech becomes
increasingly more difﬁcult to understand because it is both quieter (whispering and muttering) and
more abbreviated and condensed (occasional words rather than complete sentences). Kohlberg and
colleagues (1968) reported that children continue to use this covert private speech well into middle
childhood, and more recent research has shown that private speech endures as a means of regulating
cognitive performance even during adulthood (Duncan & Cheyne, 1999, 2002).
Children’s use of private speech has been shown to be positively associated with their performance
on a range of cognitive tasks, including planning (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005) and puzzle solving
(Winsler, Diaz, McCarthy, Atencio, & Adams Chabay, 1999). More striking evidence for the role of pri-
vate speech in children’s concurrent cognitive performance comes from the ﬁnding that preventing
children from engaging in its use (via articulatory suppression) during the planning phase of an exec-
utive function task results in impaired performance (Lidstone, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2010). In addition
to its facilitation of concurrent cognitive performance, children’s tendency to engage in private speech
during executive planning tasks is also positively associated with their engagement in phonological
recoding strategies during a working memory task (Al-Namlah, Fernyhough, & Meins, 2006) and with
the richness with which they recall autobiographical memories (Al-Namlah, Meins, & Fernyhough,
2012). Moreover, children’s use of private speech shows consistency across different tasks and con-
texts (Lidstone, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2011; Winsler, De León, Wallace, Carlton, & Willson-Quayle,
2003), suggesting that internalization of private speech may represent a domain-general shift in chil-
dren’s ability verbally to mediate their behavior (Fernyhough, 2008).
Private speech appears to be a universal feature of childhood. For example, there is evidence that
developmental disorders such as attention deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Berk & Landau, 1993;
Berk & Potts, 1991; Winsler, Manfra, & Diaz, 2007) and even speciﬁc language impairment (Lidstone,
Meins, & Fernyhough, 2012) merely delay the internalization of private speech rather than prevent
children from using such speech to regulate their behavior. But despite this evidence for the univer-
sality of private speech, there are individual differences in its use at any given age. Such differences
highlight the potential impact of children’s social environment on the development of private speech.
For example, more advanced private speech has been found to be associated with an authoritative par-
enting style (Behrend & Rosengren, 1992; Winsler, Feder, Way, & Manfra, 2006) and higher socioeco-
nomic status (Berk & Garvin, 1984). Conversely, delays in private speech development have been
reported in children whose early social experiences have been restricted. Children brought up in
low-income Appalachian families, a culture where adult–child verbal communication is limited, show
delays in private speech (Berk & Garvin, 1984), as do children from low-income families with a history
of abuse (Diaz, Neal, & Vachio, 1991). Consistent with Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) contention that private
speech has its origins in early social dialogue, these individual differences in private speech have been
interpreted with reference to the differing levels of engagement in adult–child social exchange affor-
ded by these wide-ranging family contexts.
In contrast to this broad literature on social–environmental inﬂuences on private speech, little
attention has been given to the potential role of child-centered social engagement characteristics.
The current study is the ﬁrst to investigate whether children’s imaginary social interaction fulﬁlls a
similar role to social engagement with real-life partners in the developmental progression of private
speech. Speciﬁcally, we focused on whether children’s creation of imaginary companions is related to
the sophistication and content of their private speech. Svendsen (1934) deﬁned an imaginary compan-
ion as ‘‘an invisible character named and referred to in conversation with other persons or played with
directly for a period of time, at least several months, having an air of reality for the child, but no appar-
ent objective basis’’ (p. 988). This deﬁnition has endured, but modern research has also included imag-
inary beings that are embodied in a toy or an object (so-called personiﬁed objects) within the category
of imaginary companions. Prevalence rates of having an imaginary companion at some point during
childhood range from 10% (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999) to 65% (Taylor, Carlson, Maring, Gerow, & Charley,
2004), with typical rates around 20% to 50% (Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, & Coltheart, 2007; Gleason,
2005; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006).
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(Taylor, 1999) and report that imaginary companions and real-life friends fulﬁll similar social roles
(Gleason, 2002). Gleason and Hohmann (2006) investigated children’s views about their relationships
with their imaginary companions and with real children with whom the friendships were either recip-
rocated or nonreciprocated. Gleason and Hohmann reported that there were no perceived differences
between imaginary companions and reciprocated real friends with respect either to children’s ten-
dency to want to play with the individuals and tell the individuals a secret or to the individuals’ ten-
dency to like the children more than other children and to think that the children were good at a lot of
things. In contrast, children scored their imaginary companions more highly across these different
dimensions than they did real children with whom they had nonreciprocated friendships. These ﬁnd-
ings highlight the high level of intimacy and social communication in children’s relationships with
their imaginary companions. If social dialogue with an imaginary companion can be considered to ful-
ﬁll a similar role to that with a real-life caregiver or peer, having an imaginary companion would be
expected to be positively associated with private speech development. Moreover, the fact that re-
search suggests that children do not invent imaginary companions to compensate for their lack of real
friends (e.g., Gleason, 2004; Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup, 2000) indicates that social exchange with
imaginary companions will be in addition to typical levels of interaction with peers. Exploring the
relation between children’s imaginary companion status and their private speech may thus provide
an interesting test of Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) proposal that social experience plays an important role
in private speech development.
How might any such imaginary companion-related differences in children’s private speech best be
characterized? Having an imaginary companion and the greater opportunities for dialogic self-talk
that an imaginary companion affords might facilitate the internalization of private speech, leading
to the prediction that the private speech of children who have imaginary companions will be more
developmentally advanced than that of their peers who do not. Speciﬁcally, the private speech of chil-
dren who have imaginary companions would be predicted to be more covert (indicating partial inter-
nalization). In addition, imaginary companion status may relate to the content of children’s private
speech. For example, engaging in dialogue with and about their imaginary companions may relate
to a tendency to include more conversational exchange and fantasy themes within their private
speech. Harris (2000) argued that engaging with an imaginary companion is a very rich form of
role-play and thus requires the child to take on the persona of the imaginary companion and to take
the companion’s perspective into account. In line with this suggestion, children who have imaginary
companions have been found to be better able than their peers who do not have imaginary compan-
ions to understand a listener’s or observer’s perspective in the context of (a) conveying speciﬁc infor-
mation (Roby & Kidd, 2008), (b) storytelling and autobiographical recall (Trionﬁ & Reese, 2009), and
(c) attributing knowledge about unobservable aspects of themselves relating to dreaming and hunger
(Davis, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2011). Their grasp of other people’s perspectives may thus facilitate the
use of imaginary dialogue and fantasy in the private speech of children who have imaginary
companions.
The possibility that imaginary companion-related differences may relate both to the degree of
internalization and to the content of private speech raises the issue of observational context. Private
speech has typically been elicited and examined in two main ways. First, it is common for experiment-
ers to use cognitive tasks to elicit private speech in the classroom or developmental laboratory (e.g.,
Berk & Landau, 1993; Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005; Lidstone et al., 2010, 2011; Winsler et al., 2003).
Observing private speech during challenging cognitive tasks is ideal for investigating children’s use
of task-related private speech and the extent to which such speech relates to task success, but it is less
well suited to exploring narrative and fantasy in private speech. Other studies have assessed private
speech in more open-ended contexts such as free play (Fernyhough & Russell, 1997; Kraft & Berk,
1998; Olszewski & Fuson, 1982). Unlike private speech observed during speciﬁed cognitive tasks,
the private speech that children use during play sheds light on the topics and themes that they them-
selves choose to talk about, thereby providing insight into how children use this speech to structure
self-determined tasks (Kraft & Berk, 1998). Private speech may differ in play situations, not just
according to what goals children set for themselves, but also with respect to the materials available
to serve as physical outlets for their imagination (Olszewski & Fuson, 1982). For this reason, the
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solving and play contexts. Moreover, parents reported that their children engaged in more private
speech during fantasy play than during problem-solving activities (Winsler et al., 2006), suggesting
that play contexts may optimize children’s tendency to engage in private speech. Consequently, we
chose to observe private speech during free play in order to explore how children’s imaginary com-
panion status related to the content of their private speech as well as its level of internalization.
In summary, the aim of the study reported here was to investigate how a child’s creation of an
imaginary companion is related to (a) the degree of internalization and (b) the content of the child’s
private speech during free play. Given the reported relations between socioeconomic status (SES) and
private speech (Berk & Garvin, 1984; Diaz et al., 1991), the current study involved a socially diverse
sample of children and investigated whether any relation between imaginary companion status and
private speech was independent of children’s SES.Method
Participants
Participants were 148 61-month-olds (73 girls, 75 boys, mean age = 61.3 months, range = 59–64)
from socially diverse backgrounds. SES was assessed using the Hollingshead index (Hollingshead,
1975); scores ranged from 14 to 66 (M = 35.73, SD = 14.04), with 59 children being classed as low
SES (parents educated only to minimum school-leaving age and unemployed or in menial/manual
employment). The children had been participating with their mothers in a longitudinal study begun
during the ﬁrst year of life (see Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Turner, & Leekam, 2011; Meins et al.,
2012). Parents gave full informed consent at each testing phase.
Materials and methods
Children’s private speech was assessed from a free play session that was conducted in the univer-
sity’s developmental laboratory. The private speech assessment formed part of a 90-min testing ses-
sion involving the child and mother. The imaginary companion interview was conducted
approximately 1 week later in a quiet area in the child’s school as part of a separate testing session
that lasted approximately 30 min.
Speech coding
The free play session followed immediately after the mother and child had participated in a joint
pretense task involving visiting an ice cream parlor. The experimenter gave the mother a booklet of
questionnaires to complete and directed her to sit on a chair in the corner of the testing room. The
experimenter then told the child that he or she could continue playing, and the toys and props from
the joint pretense task were available. The experimenter stayed in the room and responded to the
child if he or she asked questions or attempted to involve the experimenter in play, but otherwise
she refrained from talking to or playing with the child. The play session lasted until the mother had
completed the questionnaire, with the average session lasting 5 min (range = 2–14). Children were
ﬁlmed throughout the session by two remote-controlled cameras mounted on opposite walls of the
testing room. The cameras provided a clear view of the child’s face throughout the session.
Children’s speech during the session was later transcribed verbatim and coded for private speech.
Children’s speech was ﬁrst divided into discrete utterances. An utterance was deﬁned as a unit of
speech containing no temporal or semantic discontinuities. A temporal discontinuity was deﬁned as
a pause of at least 2 s, whereas a semantic discontinuity was deﬁned as a change in content regardless
of whether it was preceded by a pause. Each utterance was ﬁrst coded as social or private using criteria
outlined by Winsler, Fernyhough, McClaren, and Way (2004).
Social speech. These are utterances addressed to a social partner (the mother or experimenter) as indi-
cated by the following markers: (a) eye contact, where the child shows sustained eye contact with the
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experimenter or mother through gaze direction or physical contact or where the mother’s or experi-
menter’s behavior involves the child within 2 s of the utterance; (c) content markers, where the child’s
utterance has the same topic as the mother’s or experimenter’s preceding utterance or where the child
addresses the mother or experimenter by name; and (d) temporal contiguity, where the child’s utter-
ance occurs less than 2 s after any other social utterance.
Private speech. These were utterances that did not meet the above criteria for social speech. Each pri-
vate speech utterance was further coded using a scheme adapted fromWinsler and colleagues’ (2003)
criteria. Each private speech utterance was placed into 1 of 11 mutually exclusive and exhaustive cat-
egories: (a) exclamations—typically one-word expletives or expressions of affect (e.g., ‘‘Oh!’’ ‘‘Oops!’’
‘‘Ha!’’ ‘‘Woah!’’); (b) nonwords—sound effects, wordplay, humming (e.g., ‘‘Dum di dum,’’ ‘‘Vroom,’’
explosion noises); (c) descriptions of the self—statements about the child’s state or behavior (e.g., ‘‘I
found a ﬁsh,’’ ‘‘I’m hungry,’’ ‘‘I want the strawberry,’’ ‘‘I like this!’’); (d) descriptions of the environ-
ment/task—statements about the child’s surroundings or the task (e.g., ‘‘They’re the same color,’’
‘‘It’s hot in here,’’ counting items); (e) evaluative or motivational statements—statements about the
child’s ability, performance, or motivation, self-reinforcement or deprecation, evaluation of the task
(e.g., ‘‘I did it,’’ ‘‘I’m good at this,’’ ‘‘Silly me,’’ ‘‘This is easy’’); (f) plans/hypothetical reasoning—planning
or future-oriented statements, if–then constructions (e.g., ‘‘I need a purple one,’’ ‘‘I’ll do this ﬁrst,’’ ‘‘If I
put this here’’); (g) commands to the self—explicit instructions to the self with imperative verb con-
structions (e.g., ‘‘Pick them up,’’ ‘‘Don’t put that one,’’ ‘‘Get one more’’); (h) questions/answers—ques-
tions addressed to the self or clear answers to one’s own questions (e.g., ‘‘Which one should I put
next?’’ ‘‘Where’s the blue?’’ ‘‘Is that right?’’); (i) transitional statements—reﬂective utterances that
had to do with ending one activity and starting another (e.g., ‘‘So,’’ ‘‘Then,’’ ‘‘Next,’’ ‘‘Okay,’’ ‘‘There’’);
(j) fantasy-related/dialogue—any statements with a fantasy theme (e.g., ‘‘Yum, yum,’’ ‘‘I’m going to be
rich, this is going to be great!’’ ‘‘Teddy wants an ice cream,’’ ‘‘We’re opening the shop’’) or any dialogue
in which the child addressed the stuffed animals or other toys or spoke on behalf of the animals or toys
(e.g., ‘‘What do you want teddy?’’ ‘‘I’d like strawberry please’’) or spoke in a different voice; and (k)
covert private speech—muttering, whispering, verbal lip movements, and unintelligible speech (covert
private speech was not coded for content given that it was impossible to discern what the child was
saying).
Private speech in categories (c) to (i) is equivalent to Berk’s (1986) Level 2 task-relevant overt pri-
vate speech. The covert private speech category maps directly onto Berk’s (1986) Level 3 private
speech (the most sophisticated, internalized form of private speech). Children received a frequency
score for the number of private speech utterances falling into each of the 11 categories. Private speech
content was coded by a researcher blind to imaginary companion status, with a randomly selected 20%
of sessions being coded by a second blind researcher. Interrater agreement was j = .92.
Imaginary companion interview
Children’s imaginary companion status was assessed using the imaginary companion interview
developed by Taylor and Carlson (1997). The experimenter began, ‘‘Now I am going to ask you some
questions about friends. Some friends are real, like the kids who live on your street, the ones you play
with. And some friends are pretend friends. Pretend friends are ones that are make-believe that you
pretend are real. Do you understand?’’ When the child indicated that he or she understood, the exper-
imenter went on to ask whether the child had a pretend friend. If the child indicated the existence of
an imaginary companion, the child was asked (a) the name of the imaginary companion, (b) whether
people other than the child could see the imaginary companion, (c) whether the child could see the
imaginary companion, (d) the gender, age, and physical appearance of the imaginary friend, (e) what
the child liked and disliked about the imaginary friend, and (f) where the imaginary friend lived and
slept. Children’s imaginary companions could be entirely invisible or personiﬁed objects. Examples of
children’s imaginary companions are shown in Table 1.
Mothers completed a questionnaire similar to the child imaginary companion interview in order to
provide parental corroboration of their children’s imaginary companions. Mothers were also asked to
indicate how long the imaginary companions had existed. Children were credited with having
Table 1
Examples of imaginary companions.
1 Mr. Nobody: an invisible boy with brown, curly hair down to his waist who never sleeps and watches TV all through
the night
2 Yellow Granny: an invisible girl with dyed, gingery hair tied up in a ponytail who lives in a ﬂat at the top of the
Tower of London
3 Mo: an invisible, mischievous boy who lives in the child’s bathroom
4 A nameless, tiny, invisible squirrel who lives on the child’s back during the day
5 Casey: an invisible girl with green eyes and long blonde hair whose favorite color is pink; she wears a shirt with love
hearts on it and sleeps in a hotel every night
6 Bear: a personiﬁed object (a teddy bear) who is old and wise and always knows everything
7 Teddy: a personiﬁed object (an elephant) who likes to hide away but can ﬂy with his ears
8 Fin: a personiﬁed object (a hound dog) who has very pointy ears and can run really fast
9 Fudge: a personiﬁed object (a rabbit) who has long, white and gray ears and a plaster on his foot, and who likes to go
into the child’s room and move things around
10 Buttons: a personiﬁed object (a dog) who is white with black spots and has a magic collar that can change color
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vincing, ﬂeshed-out descriptions of the imaginary companions. For the corroborated imaginary com-
panions, mothers reported that the imaginary companions had existed for between 2 and 48 months,
with the average duration of existence being 25.19 months (SD = 12.65). Mothers who reported that
the imaginary companions had been present since infancy explained that the companions had existed
ever since their children could speak. These very early imaginary companions were all personiﬁed ob-
jects. For all of the noncorroborated imaginary companions, children explained that the imaginary
companions were visible only to them, often saying that no one else knew about the imaginary com-
panions or that their existence was secret. The veracity of imaginary companions that were not cor-
roborated by the mothers was assessed by two independent raters; perfect agreement was achieved.
Receptive language ability
Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS;
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) to control for verbal ability given its previously observed po-
sitive association with having an imaginary companion (Taylor & Carlson, 1997) and with private
speech (Al-Namlah et al., 2006). Verbal ability data were available for 140 children. The mean stan-
dardized score was 103.64 (SD = 14.71, range = 43–166).Results
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses
Of the 148 children, 68 (46%) stated that they had imaginary companions, 34 (50%) of which were
corroborated by their mothers. The pattern of ﬁndings was identical when using the total or mater-
nally corroborated imaginary companion groups. Consequently, only results using the total imaginary
companion group are reported below. Of the 68 imaginary companions, 47 (69%) were entirely invis-
ible. Children with invisible versus personiﬁed object imaginary companions did not differ on any of
the private speech measures (ts < 1.26, ds < 0.45); thus, these two categories were collapsed in the
analyses. Imaginary companion status was unrelated to children’s BPVS scores, t(138) = 0.25, p = .807.
A total of 18 children (9 girls and 9 boys), 2 of whom were in the imaginary companion group,
failed to use any private speech during their observations. As shown in Table 2, several of the subtypes
of private speech occurred at low frequencies. Thus, categories assessing similar aspects of private
speech were amalgamated as follows: Exclamations and nonwords were summed, and descriptions
of self, evaluative/motivational statements, plans/hypothetical reasoning, commands to self, ques-
tions/answers, descriptions of the environment/task, and transitional statements were summed to
form a play-focused overt private speech category, which can be regarded as equivalent to Berk’s
(1986) Level 2 (task-relevant, overt) private speech. The frequency scores for the fantasy-related/
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for private speech variables.
Range Mean (SD)
Total utterances 0–86 11.48 (13.72)
Exclamations 0–10 0.77 (1.43)
Nonwords 0–37 1.99 (3.99)
Descriptions of the self 0–6 0.58 (1.20)
Descriptions of the environment/task 0–12 1.48 (2.37)
Evaluative/motivational statements 0–6 0.41 (1.02)
Plans/hypothetical reasoning 0–16 0.76 (1.78)
Commands to the self 0–8 0.54 (1.26)
Questions/answers 0–4 0.33 (0.72)
Transitional statements 0–5 0.43 (0.94)
Fantasy-related/dialogue 0–44 2.32 (5.00)
Covert private speech 0–24 1.81 (3.46)
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dexed stand-alone aspects of private speech; thus, these categories remained unchanged.
The private speech measures were all non-normally distributed. The F test is robust against viola-
tions of the assumption of normality as long as there are at least 20 degrees of freedom for error
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), so data were not transformed. However, we identiﬁed outliers for some
of the private speech measures using Hoaglin and Iglewicz’s (1987) procedure and took the conserva-
tive approach of also running the analyses with outliers excluded. For exclamations/nonwords, there
was 1 outlier (from the imaginary companion group); for play-focused private speech, there were no
outliers; for fantasy-related/dialogue, there were 3 outliers (2 from the imaginary companion group);
and for covert private speech, there were 6 outliers (5 from the imaginary companion group).
The length of time the play session took was positively correlated with children’s play-focused pri-
vate speech, q(146) = 0.21, p = .011, but was unrelated to the other private speech measures (qs < .15).
For the children whose imaginary companions had maternal corroboration, there was no relation
between maternal reports on how long the imaginary companions had existed and any of the private
speech measures (qs < .15).
Child gender was unrelated to imaginary companion status and to the private speech measures,
and it was not considered further in the analyses.Imaginary companion status and private speech
Table 3 shows the mean scores for the private speech categories as a function of imaginary com-
panion status. The relation between imaginary companion status and children’s private speech was
investigated using a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with imaginary companion sta-
tus (imaginary companion or no imaginary companion) entered as a ﬁxed variable and the frequency
scores for the four private speech categories (exclamations/nonwords, play-focused, fantasy-related/
dialogue, or covert) entered as the dependent variables. SES, BPVS scores, children’s total number of
utterances during the session, and overall duration of the play session were added as covariates. There
was a main effect of imaginary companion status, F(1, 133) = 3.16, p = .016, g2 = .089.
With regard to the separate categories of private speech, compared with their peers who did not
have imaginary companions, children in the imaginary companion group engaged in more covert pri-
vate speech, F(1, 133) = 11.32, p = .001, g2 = .085. There was a trend for children in the imaginary com-
panion group to engage in more fantasy-related/dialogue private speech than their peers who did not
have imaginary companions, F(1, 133) = 3.63, p = .059, g2 = .027. Imaginary companion status was not
related to exclamations/nonwords, F(1, 133) = 0.04, p = .849, g2 = .000, or play-focused overt private
speech, F(1, 133) = 2.02, p = .157, g2 = .015.
The MANCOVA was rerun as above but with the outliers excluded for the relevant private speech
categories. With outliers removed, there was a main effect of imaginary companion status, F(1,
125) = 5.26, p = .001, g2 = .147. With regard to the separate categories of private speech, compared
Table 3
Means (and standard deviations) for private speech categories as a function of imaginary companion status.
IC (n = 68) NIC (n = 80)
Exclamations/nonwords 3.28 (5.42) 2.39 (3.72)
Exclamations/nonwords (excluding outliers) 2.77 (3.51) 2.39 (3.72)
Play-focused overt private speech 4.89 (6.12) 4.31 (6.19)
Fantasy-related/dialogue 2.60 (6.77) 2.22 (3.48)
Fantasy-related/dialogue (excluding outliers) 1.46 (2.44) 2.05 (3.11)
Covert private speech 3.02 (4.82) 1.00 (1.62)
Covert private speech (excluding outliers) 1.94 (2.45) 0.84 (1.15)
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engaged in more covert private speech, F(1, 125) = 12.80, p = .000, g2 = .102, and less fantasy-related/
dialogue private speech, F(1, 123) = 6.93, p = .010, g2 = .055.Discussion
The aim of the study reported here was to assess the extent to which the content and level of inter-
nalization of children’s private speech during free play related to their imaginary companion status.
Controlling for SES, children’s receptive verbal ability and total number of utterances, and the duration
of the play session, there was a main effect of imaginary companion status on private speech. Specif-
ically, imaginary companion group children were more likely than their peers who did not have imag-
inary companions to engage in covert private speech (equivalent to Berk’s Level 3 category). This effect
of imaginary companion status on children’s use of covert private speech was maintained when out-
liers (who were predominantly from the imaginary companion group) were removed.
In the Introduction, we considered whether having an imaginary companion would be positively
related to the level of internalization of children’s private speech or to the extent to which private
speech involved fantasy and dialogue. The results of the current study suggest that having an imagi-
nary companion is associated with greater internalization of private speech. The analysis including all
children also indicated a trend for children with imaginary companions to engage in more fantasy-re-
lated/dialogue private speech than their counterparts who did not have imaginary companions. How-
ever, the direction of this effect was reversed when outliers were removed. These contrary ﬁndings are
worthy of further discussion. Given that it was not possible to discern the content of children’s covert
private speech and the fact that this partially internalized form of speech was most common in the
imaginary companion group children, it is somewhat difﬁcult to make strong conclusions about
how the content of private speech varies as a function of imaginary companion status. It is likely that
at least some of the content of covert speech will involve fantasy or dialogue, and so the difference
between the two groups on this category of speech may be more apparent than real. Anecdotally, sev-
eral examples of covert private speech in children with imaginary companions were clearly dialogic in
nature, and one child was observed to have a one-way covert ‘‘conversation,’’ complete with facial
expressions and hand gestures, with an imaginary being. Thus, until measures on the content of covert
speech can be obtained, it is not possible to establish the true relation between imaginary companion
status and the fantasy content of children’s spontaneous private speech. Future research could at-
tempt to assess covert speech content by having children wear sensitive microphones to record their
whispering and muttering; alternatively, children could hear the recording of themselves and be asked
to explain what they were saying.
In further exploring the relation between having an imaginary companion and the content of chil-
dren’s private speech, it would be interesting to investigate whether the themes of children’s actual
interactions with their imaginary companions relate to the content of their private speech at other
times. Thus, observing children while they are interacting with their imaginary companions would
be useful. In addition, research could focus on children’s engagement in private speech in other con-
texts (e.g., during cognitive planning tasks) to establish whether task-speciﬁc private speech is simi-
larly related to children’s imaginary companion status. Given the evidence for concordance in the use
and degree of internalization of private speech across different contexts (Lidstone et al., 2011; Winsler
P.E. Davis et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 116 (2013) 561–571 569et al., 2003), one would expect task-based private speech to be similarly related to imaginary compan-
ion status, with imaginary companion group children’s private speech being more internalized than
that of their counterparts who do not have imaginary companions.
The current study is the ﬁrst to investigate whether children’s imaginary social engagement relates
to their private speech development. Having an imaginary companion was proposed to give children
more numerous opportunities for engaging in social dialogue, which should facilitate the development
of private speech, in line with Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) theory. The observed pattern of ﬁndings is con-
sistent with the view that self-generated social speech between children and their imaginary compan-
ions may fulﬁll a similar facilitatory role as social speech with real-life partners. To explore this
relation in greater detail, future research could investigate how individual differences in the extent
to which children engage in dialogic exchange with their imaginary companions relate to the level
of internalization of their private speech. If imaginary social exchange fulﬁlls a similar role to actual
social exchange in the developmental progression of private speech, children who engage most in dia-
logue with their imaginary companions should have the most internalized private speech.
Although the ﬁndings reported here are consistent with the view that imaginary social exchange
may facilitate the internalization of private speech, given that imaginary companion status and private
speech were assessed at the same point in time, it is important to consider the opposite direction of
cause and effect; it could be that private speech is the driving force behind children’s creation of imag-
inary companions. This possibility was raised by Fernyhough and colleagues (2007), who proposed
that the internalization of social and private speech might result in young children’s mental world
becoming populated with voices in dialogic interplay. One result might be the construction of imag-
inary companions, which Pearson (1998) suggested could result from children’s attempts to make
essentially hallucination-like experiences more socially acceptable. Indeed, there is empirical evidence
showing that children with imaginary companions are more likely than their counterparts who lack
imaginary companions to report hearing words in ambiguous auditory stimuli (Fernyhough et al.,
2007; Pearson et al., 2001). Children who are precocious in their private speech development may cre-
ate imaginary companions as a way of reifying and personifying this experience of an internal dialogue
between different voices. Overt private speech often has a dialogic structure (e.g., Berk & Garvin, 1984;
Kohlberg et al., 1968), with children using self-answered questions and talking on behalf of toys. In
addition, private speech and the ability to engage in internal dialogue have been linked to certain as-
pects of creativity (Daugherty, White, & Manning, 1995; Fernyhough, 2009). Fernyhough and col-
leagues (2007) proposed that examining the developmental association between private speech and
an imaginary companion might shed light on the causal relations between these two developmental
phenomena.
Although the current data cannot settle the true direction of cause and effect, there is one reason
for doubting that children’s creation of imaginary companions is developmentally secondary to the
internalization of private speech. The mothers’ corroboration in the study reported here showed that
the imaginary companions of these 5-year-olds were long-standing, having existed for a mean dura-
tion of more than 25 months. This suggests that many of the children’s imaginary companions would
have predated the development of private speech given that self-talk is typically assumed to peak dur-
ing the late preschool years (Berk, 1992; Kohlberg et al., 1968). To establish the true direction of cause
and effect between imaginary companion status and private speech, longitudinal research is needed to
attempt to pinpoint the exact time at which children created their imaginary companions in relation
to their private speech development. Thus, charting the association between the developmental pro-
gression of private speech and the creation of and engagement with an imaginary companion is an
interesting avenue for future research.
Investigating the relation between the length of existence of an imaginary companion and a child’s
private speech would also be worthwhile. One could hypothesize that having an imaginary companion
at the time when the child’s ability to communicate is developing most rapidly will have the greatest
facilitatory effect on private speech development. Thus, the precise timing of the imaginary compan-
ion’s existence in relation to the child’s communication abilities, rather than the overall length of exis-
tence of the imaginary companion, may prove to be a crucial variable in understanding the
longitudinal relation between having an imaginary companion and private speech. Although the cur-
rent study obtained maternal report on the length of existence of children’s imaginary companions, it
570 P.E. Davis et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 116 (2013) 561–571was not possible to tie in the imaginary companions’ existence with the individual children’s language
and communication development. Moreover, half of the mothers were unaware that their children
had imaginary companions, meaning that data on how long the companions had existed were avail-
able for only a small subgroup of the overall sample.
In summary, the results of the current study provide the ﬁrst evidence that children’s imaginary
social engagement may relate to the development of private speech in a way similar to the role played
by children’s social interaction with real people. Although further research is needed to establish the
precise nature of cause and effect in the relation between children’s imaginary companion status and
their internalization of private speech, our ﬁndings highlight the potential role of child-centered indi-
vidual differences in the development of private speech, and thus extend previous research on social
environmental inﬂuences on children’s self-talk.Acknowledgments
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